CARDINAL NEWMAN ON THE INDEFECTIBILITY OF CERTITUDE
Jay NEWMAN There are man y passages in Cardinal Newman's Grammar of Assent which provide fresh insights into subjects widely discussed by contemporary epistemologists, and sorne of the most interesting of these are to be found in the section of the treatise which deals \Vith the "Indefectibility of Certitude" (Chapter 7, § 2), In the following pages we shaH consider Newman's attack on epistemological scepticism and his analysis of certitude, We are going to see that there is a fundamental inconsistency in Newman '5 theory of certitude, but we shall also find that Newman has raised sorne disturhing epistemological problems, Newman's philosophy falls very much within the British Empiricist tradition, Newman took his early philosophical training at Oxford, was a keen student of Locke's Essay, and was familiar with the idealistic and sceptical arguments of Berkeley and Hume, His discussion of the indefectibility of certitude begins with an attack on a kind of scepticism with which ail contemporary epistemologists are familial', He writes, What looks like certitude always is exposed to the chance of tuming out to be a mistake, If our intimate, deliberate conviction may be counterfeit in the case of one proposition, why not in the case of another') If in the case of one man, why not in the case of a hundred? ls certitude then ever possible without the attendant gift of infallihility?
And in the next paragraph, he asks, And, as to the feeling of finality and security, ought it ever to be indulged? Is it not a mere weakness or extravagance; a deceit, to be eschewed by every clear and prudent mind? With the countless instances, on ail sides of us, of human fallibility, with the constant exhibitions of antagonist certitudes, who can so sin against modesty and sobriety of mind, as not to be content with probahility, as the truc guide of life, renouncing ambitious thoughts, which are sure either to delude him, or to disappoint?
Newman begins his answer by distinguishing between i nfallibi lit y and certitude, He argues that many people have been led to scepticism because of their failure to understand this distinction, "A certitude," Newman writes, .. is directed to this or that particular proposition; it is not a faculty or gift, but a disposition of mind relatively to a definite case which is before me", Infallibility, on the other hand, "is a faculty or gift, and relates, not to sorne one truth in particular, but to all possible propositions in a given subject-matter". Only people, and not beliefs or opinions, are fallible or infallible. A person can be fallible and still be certain of specifie propositions: Certitude is at most nothing more th an infallibility pro Iwe vice, and promises nothing as to the truth of any proposition besides its own. That 1 am certain of this proposition to-day, is no ground for thinking that 1 shall have a right to be certain of that proposition to-morrow: and that 1 am wrong in my convictions about to-day's proposition, does not hinder my having a true conviction, a genuine certitude, about to-morrow's proposition. If indeed 1 claimed to be infallible, one failure wou Id shiver my daim to pieces; but 1 may daim to be certain of the truth to which 1 have already attained, though 1 should arrive at no new truths in addition as long as 1 live.
After making this important distinction between a faculty and a propositional attitude, Newman admits that he has not as yet disposed of the problem of epistemological scepticism. Certitude, he observes, involves a sense of security and of repose, and it is still not clear how this security can be ours. We have ail been "balked by false certitudes a hundred times," and so how is future certitude possible "when it thus manifestly ministers to error and to scepticism?" ln answering this new question, Newman does not deny that the false certitudes of the past "are to the prejudice of subsequent ones." He admits that they constitute an "antecedent difficuIty" in our allowing ourselves to be certain of something today or tomorrow. " [B] ut antecedent objections to an act are not sufficient of themselves to prohibit its exercise; the y may demand of us an increased circumspection before committing ourselves to it, but may be met with reasons more than sufficient to overcome them." Newman is making an empirical daim here. and a true one. At the time when Newman was writing these lines, Peirce's study of "Sorne Consequences of Four Incapacities" had just appeared in an 1868 edition of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy. There, criticizing the scepticism of Descartes' first Meditation, Peirce warns, "Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts." This theme is one of Newman's favorites, and can be traced back to his earliest philosophical writings. Still, that we are and can be certain does not entail that we have a right to be. Newman dearly believes that the reasons that overcome the antecedent objections are sound ones, reasons that ought to overcome them. Now, certitude is an assent "given expressly after reasoning," and if my certitude is unfounded, "it is the reasoning that is in fauIt, not my assent to it." Moreover, ft is the law of my mind to seal up the conclusions to which ratiocination has brought me, by that formai assent which 1 have called a certitude. So much for Newman's attack on a basic kind of epistemological scepticism. Now let us contrast it with his analysis of certitude. In summarizing his views on the nature of certitude in the last paragraph of Chapter 7, Newman writes, It seems then that on the whole there are three conditions of certitude: that it follows on investigation and proof, that it is accompanied by a specific sense 16 of intellectual satisfaction and repose, and that it is irreversible. If the asse nt is made without rational grounds, it is a rash judgment, a fancy, or a prejudice: if without the sense of finality, it is scarcely more than an inference; if without permanence, it is a mere conviction.
Certitude is probably not the only indefectible assent: "prejudice may be such," but the two assents cannot be confused, for the latter is an assent "previous to rational grounds." Indefectibility is at least a "negative test of certitude, or sine qI/ci /10/1 condition, so that whoever loses his conviction on a given point is thereby proved not to have been certain of it." Some contemporary epistemologists (e.g., certain Austinians) would criticize Newman on this point, but Newman is certainly trying hard to give an account of expressions like "1 am certain that ... " which is faithful to ordinary-Ianguage usage. In fact, throughout the Grammar, Newman is constantly appealing to ordinary language as a sounder criterion than the technical terminology of philosophers and intellectuals, whom Newman does not trust as mu ch as the average man.
ln pointing to rationality, the sense offinality, and permanence, Newman has set down three very demanding conditions of certitude. He has shown that he is willing to dismiss much that appears to be certitude as "false certitude," a counterfeit article which is quite different from the genuine one. But he has also attacked epistemological scepticism and argued that certitude has a "definite and fixed place among our mental acts." But now he begins to run into trouble. How do we know when we are certain? At subsection 6 of Chapter 7, § 2, Newman writes, Certitude does not admit of an interior, immediate test, sufficient to discriminate it from false certitude. Su ch a test is rendered impossible from the circumstance that, when we make the mental act expressed by "1 know," we sum up the who le series of reflex judgments which might, each in turn, successively exercise a critical function towards those of the series which precede it.
A few pages earlier, at subsection 4, he has written, [C]ertitude follows upon examination and pro of, as the bell sounds the hour, when the hands reach it,-so that no act or state of the intellect is certitude, however it may resemble it, which does not observe this appointed law. This proviso greatly diminishes the catalogue of genuine certitudes.
At subsection 3, he has described the sense of certitude as "the bell of the inte\1ect," and warned, "that it strikes when it should not is a proofthat the clock is out of order, no proof that the bell will be untrustworthy and useless, when it comes to us adjusted and regulated from the hands of the clock-maker." Is Newman being consistent here?
That he is not becomes quite clear when we consider his talk about the "illative sense" in Chapter 9 ... It is the mind that reasons, not any technical apparatus of words and propositions," and we may cali its power of "judging and concluding" the "Illative Sense" ( § 2). At the end of Chapter 8, Newman writes that, "Judgment then in ail concrete matter is the architectonie facuIty: and what may be called the Illative Sense, or right judgment in ratiocination, is one branch of it." Now, in Chapter 9, he ash if there is any criteriol/ of the accuracy of an inference, "such as may be our warrant that certitude is rightly elicited in favour of the proposition inferred." He answers that there is-" the sole and final judgment on the validity of an inference in concrete matter is committed to the personal action of the ratiocinative faculty, the perfection or virtue of which 1 have called the IIIative Sense .... " The illative sense plays an important raIe in Newman's project. Newman is a Christian apologist, and his aim in the Grammar is to show that a simple, unlearned man can, without any knowledge of complex philosophical arguments, be-and have a right to be-certain of the truth of religious propositions. At Chapter 8, § 2, which bridges his discussions of the indefectibility of certitude and the role of the illative sense, he suggests that formaI inference does not enable us to become certain of what is concrete. Certitude in conCl'ete matter depends on our recognition of the "cumulation" and "converging" of subtle "probabilities." So if the average man does not possess something like the illative sense, and cannat detect when "probabilities" have "converged" to justify certitude, then, being wholly ignorant of the scientific demonstrations of Aquinas and others, he cannot and should not feel certain that God exists, that the Church' s teachings are true, etc. Whenever an empiricist philosopher has trouble explaining something that has to be explained and cannot be explained in any other way, he either turns ta scepticism or caBs upon a special sense or faculty. Newman, eschewing scepticism, gives us an iIlative sense, one which can be understood when it is compared to paraliel faculties like phronesis. Now we are in the position to see the fundamental inconsistency in Newman' s theory of certitude. Newman has introduced a specialfaculty in order to show how certitude in concrete matter is possible and warrantable (i.e., recognizable as "rightly elicited"). Newman has c\early committed himselfto the position that the warrantability of certitude depends on the reliability of the illative sense, which is the" sole and final" judge of inferences in concrete matter. But (the sense of) celtitude would not even be possible-in concrete matter, at least -if we lacked a faculty which enables us to recognize the convergence of probabilities. So the illative sense saves us from scep1icism, from uncertainty. Or does it? ln lIttacking scepticism, Newman has argued 1hat the reliability of our judgment is only one of several factors that we consider prior to allowing ourse Ives to be certain of a particular proposition. The "antecedent difficulty" of false certitudes of the past being "to the prejudice of subsequent ones" can be overcome by sound reasons which are in sorne sense independent of the ülculty of judgment. But can reasons-even very good ones-justify or ground certitude wh en the "sole and final" judge is defective, unreliable, untrustworthy? Newman wants ta have his cake and eat il. He says that certitude is possible and warrantable because we possess a special faculty, the illative sense. But he also says that certitude is possible and warrantable because our confidence in our faculty ofjudgment is not a necessary condition of il. Now consider Newman's clock analogy. Newman admits 1hat the sense of certitude, the bel! of the intellect, often strikes when il should no1. Still, according to Newman, that does not me an that the "clock" (the faculty ofjudgment) will be untrustworthy and useless when it cornes back to us "adjusted and regulated from the hands of the clock-maker." This analogy is far from satisfactory. For one thing, Newman's original c1aim was, "that 1 am wrong in my convictions about to-day's proposition, does not hinder my having a true conviction, a genuine certitude, about to-morrow' s proposition." But in the case of a clock. when we know that it has mi sIed liS once, we will not trust it again III/fil if II(JS heel/ repaired. So, if the analogy is to hold, if 1 am wrong in my convictions ahout today' s proposition, 1 should not trust my illative sense until it has been "adjusted and regulated." But to whom does one go to have his illative sense adjusted and regulated? We can agree with Newman that the faculty ofjudgment does "rcquirc and admit of discipline." But how is it disciplined and adjusted and regulated ') If inference in concrete matter is really as personal and informai as Newman thinh it is, then studying logic is not going to help us to adjust our illative senses. Besides, if the simple, unlearned man has to go to someone to have his faculty of judgment adjusted, then has not Newman's whole apologetical project been undermined'! For his main aim was to show how the simple. unlearned man cano without much difficulty, come to be certain of the truth of religious propositions. Newman could, perhaps. as he is often inclined to do, give a sort of Augustinian reply to this challenge, and argue that faith brings with it the appropriatc adju'itment of our faculty of judgment. But Newman himself admits that the logical order is reason first and faith second, and in any case, not man y contemporary epistemologists are impressed by this particular kind of Augustinian move. Newman cou Id also argue for the relevance here of his famous (and unsatisfactory) distinction between "inferences" and "assents." but even ifthis distinction were a satisfactory one, the fact is that in § 2 of Chapter 7, Newman himself has blurred the distinction.
It is clear that Cardinal Newman's approach to certitude is inconsistent and thus unsatisfactory; but we are stillieft with the epistemological problems that he has raised in his discussion. As an apologist, Newman recognizes the need for certitude:
Without certitude in religious faith there may be much decency of profession and of observance, but there can be not habit of prayer, no directness of devotion, no intercourse with the unseen, no generosity of self-sacrifice. Certitude then is essential to the Christian .... (Chapter 7. § 1.)
As far as Newman is concerned, this fact alone forces us to reject epistemological scepticism. Epistemological scepticism breeds theological scepticism. Newman is no ordinary epistemologist, but a committed Christian. He even goes so far as to say that the fact of certitude is a proof that it is not a weakness to be certain-"How it cornes about that we can be certain is not my business to determine: for me it is sufficient that certitude is leff' (Chapter 9, Introduction). Still, Newman knows that he is not much of an apologist if he does not confront the problems that he has raised. And so he tries to show certitude is possible even though wc arc ail weil aware that we have felt certain of sorne things which have turned out to be l'aise. One answer that he gives is that much that passes for (the sense of) certitude is not the real thing. But we ha ve been interested in his two other answers, the t wo which conflict. The first is, in effect, that certitude is based on reasons; the past unreliability of our faculty of judgment is a consideration to be taken into account, but only one of many, and it can be outweighed or "overcome" by others. This answer does dispose of the problem of epistemological scepticism. But even Newman is unhappy with it, for we are dearly left with a basic question-"How do we know that reasons x ,y, and z overcome the 'antecedent difficuIty' of the past unreliability of our faculty of judgment'?" That faculty is being called upon to evaluate conditions upon which it is itself overruled! So Newman is forced to concede that we cannot throw out the "dock"; we have to have it adjusted. But we are not dear as to how the dock can be adjusted; and by admitting that the dock has to be adjusted, we are admitting that the problem of epistemological scepticism still stands. Yet, recognizing that our faculty of judgment has misled us itself involves a judgment, a judgment on the faculty. There cannot be an infinite regression of su ch faculties of judgment ; perhaps the "illative sense" is selfcritical, and in that sense, truly the "sole and final" judge. If so, Newman's final answer is the most attractive. But have we really disposed of the problem of epistemological scepticism wh en we have followed Newman in acknowledging the existence of a judge or sense which is so reliable that it even recognizes its own unreliability'? 20
